Dignity in the public discourse
Elizabeth Drummond Young on how dignity requires to be combined with love and friendship if it is to be applied to how we treat each other.
Preserving the concept of dignity in public discourse
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 made a direct connection between each of us having dignity in virtue of our humanity and our having associated rights. Dignity is often used as a justification in ethical arguments and a secure foundational principle for applied ethics more generally. It also has the benefit of appealing to everyone including those of no religious belief, although the origins of universal inviolable human dignity in the context of human rights can be traced to Christian, specifically Catholic thought. In addition to its widespread appeal, and perhaps because of it, dignity (unlike ‘free speech’ for example) has not yet become a toxic concept. But is this concept, so valuable because of its common currency in danger through misuse and misunderstanding?
Scottish/ American Catholic philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre (1929- 2025) thought there was a problem with the concept of dignity, going so far as to call it dangerous. The standard interpretation of human dignity was too closely related to individualism, he thought, and it left out the important connection between the individual and society. He suggests that rather than our dignity being inviolable, humans can lose their dignity when acting against their God given end or purpose. Our purpose is to know and love God and if we choose to pursue other goals which take us away from that, we can lose or diminish our dignity. Using inviolable dignity as a foundational principle results only in our observing negative duties thinks MacIntyre. Negative duties simply tell us what not to do and are necessarily limited, so MacIntyre prioritises justice which he considers promotes positive duties. Under the auspices of justice, we give people what is their due (a positive demand). ‘Dignity,’ he says, ‘is the sham culmination of western humanism because it carries within it a shocking indifference to others. It is an asocial concept, an ideological tool of liberal commercialism’. For MacIntyre, justice rather than dignity sites an individual within a society and can establish dignity and worth only from within that social web. On his view, you can lose your dignity and then no one has any reason to treat you with respect- a startling result of his argument.
Dignity is the sham culmination of western humanism because it carries a shocking indifference to others – Alasdair MacIntyre
To see what MacIntyre had in mind, consider how dignity as a justifying principle has been used to support both assisted dying and the decriminalisation of prostitution; issues which have been raised in Scottish politics recently. Arguments supporting assisted dying and decriminalised sex work associate dignity with the values of autonomy as expressed by an individual being free to make a choice – about when to die, or whether to offer their body for sale. And in the context of MacIntyre’s argument, that reasoning is indeed very focussed on the individual and ignores for example, the social impact of permissible assisted dying or decriminalised prostitution. We can see that the concept of dignity can be stretched in arguments to provide positions which might be acceptable to a secular audience, but which will be rejected by Catholics.
But we should not be too quick to dissociate autonomy from dignity. A recent intervention by Catholic ethicists concerning the use of AI in surveillance and warfare relies on a very similar association.The AI company Anthropic’s refusal to engage with the US Government in the use of AI in warfare and surveillance was supported by these ethicists who quoted the Catholic Catechism that we are not obliged to tell the truth to everyone unless they have a right to know it. In other words, our privacy should be protected, and state surveillance is suspect. Likewise in war, agency is critical. Who is ultimately responsible for selecting targets and carrying out attacks? It is not simply a case of being concerned that a streamlined AI based system for targeting may contain fatal errors, (humans make mistakes too). It is equally that responsibility for lethal attacks cannot be passed to a non-human actor such as an AI based program which does not possess dignity and is unable to recognise it in others.
In the declaration Dignitas Infinita (2024) which spells out some of the practical ethical situations in which Pope Francis saw dignity at threat, dignity is given a multi-faceted analysis. The ‘ontological’ aspect is that which can never be diminished or lost, but the ‘moral’ and ‘social’ aspects are related to our choices which move us away from our path to God and so impact ours and others dignity. Those aspects of dignity can be harmed or diminished either in ourselves or others. Perhaps this proposal of ‘dignity under different descriptions’ would lend support to MacIntyre when he ties loss of dignity to a deviation from God’s path.
In Dignitas Infinita, the Church reiterates the dominance of the principle of dignity in its ontological inviolable aspect over justice by asking that political life and legal systems be guided by dignity as its founding principle.
The Church…ardently urges that respect for the dignity of the human person beyond all circumstances be placed at the centre of the commitment to the common good and at the centre of every legal system – Dignitas Infinita
Whilst we may remain sceptical of shifting the emphasis from justice to dignity in the way that MacIntyre suggests, he is surely right to point out the link between dignity, freedom and our purpose in this life. Our use of dignity as a principle must be guided by our understanding of how our lives and those of others are properly shaped and the actions that we must take to achieve that. For Christians, this is related directly to God’s will and his love for his creation. To ensure that dignity stays at the heart of public ethical discussion across people of faith and none, we must pay attention to how we frame meaning and purpose in life. Can we find common ground?
Structured argument in applied ethics may not be the best way to do this. Using dignity as a blunt ethical tool – a searchlight almost - in narrative accounts to highlight good and evil can be more powerful. If someone through terrible treatment seems to have lost all dignity, then an observer who does see through to the human beneath appears saintly, as Raimond Gaita has demonstrated in his descriptions of terrible treatment of people in concentration camps and mental institutions. And according to Simone Weil, we see that someone who is severely afflicted and brought low by the actions of others is seen to lose all earthly dignity, highlighting the evil of the abuse. Both writers link the loss or perceived loss of dignity with the dehumanising process of turning another human being into an object. This has resonance with nearly everyone whether religious or not and has been a constant theme since early industrialisation and has received extra impetus from recent technological developments, such as robotics, social media and artificial intelligence.
For both writers, religiously inclined but not committed, the preventative cure and remedy to loss of dignity in dire circumstances is remarkably Christian – friendship and love.
Were it not for the many ways human beings genuinely love one another – I do not believe we would have a sense of the sacredness of individuals, or of their inalienable rights or dignity– Raimond Gaita
Demonstrating friendship to the apparently friendless can protect them from dehumanising treatment. Paying loving attention to the unlovable restores dignity to both parties. It seems that dignity and rights (and perhaps justice too) must have love and friendship as unconditional companions. Even if this doesn’t provide ready answers to difficult ethical questions, it is surely a conclusion which has universal appeal.
By Elizabeth Drummond Young
Elizabeth Drummod Young is a teaching fellow in philosophy at the University of Edinburgh and a founder member of The Albertus Institute (albertus.scot)
References
Find MacIntyre’s lecture on dignity on YouTube:
The Catholic ethicists in the Anthropic case:
Dignitas Infinita
Gaita, R. (2000). A Common Humanity: Thinking about Love and Truth and Justice. London & New York: Routledge.
Weil, S. (2002). Gravity and Grace. London: Routledge. (Original work published 1948).